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This paper introduces optimal competition: the best form of compe-
tition in an industry that a competition authority can achieve under the
information constraint that it cannot observe ﬁrms’ eﬃciency levels. We
show that the optimal competition outcome in an industry becomes more
competitive as more money is spent in the industry, as the competition
authority puts less weight on producer surplus and more weight on em-
ployment. The relation between competition and entry costs is U-shaped.
Finally conditions are derived under which Cournot competition is too
competitive compared to the optimal competition outcome.
J.E.L. codes: D4, L4, L5
Keywords:competition, competition policy, objectives of competition
policy, liberalization vs. regulation
1 Introduction
Competition authorities around the world face a daunting task: with limited
means they have to monitor a huge number of sectors to see where intervention
could be welfare enhancing. A natural strategy in such a situation is to target
industries where there is (or seems to be) a lack of competition and where inter-
vention by the competition authority could make a big diﬀerence. The problem
is that economic theory does not give any guidance on this issue. Generally
speaking, economic models show how market imperfections create distortions
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1relative to the ﬁrst best outcome. However, no intervention eﬀort by a competi-
tion authority will create the ﬁrst best outcome. Hence a competition authority
which bases its selection process of industries to scrutinize on the comparison
of the current market outcome with the ﬁrst best outcome is likely to waste its
scarce resources on industries where its intervention will hardly make a diﬀer-
ence.
This paper introduces a benchmark industry outcome, called ’optimal com-
petition’, which is better achievable for a competition authority than the ﬁrst
best outcome. This benchmark is called optimal competition to signal that in
contrast to ’perfect competition’ competition is optimized under (information)
constraints. The policy recommendation is that competition authorities should
target their resources on industries where there is a big gap between the current
industry outcome and the optimal competition outcome. Before introducing the
details of this approach, consider the following motivating example.
Consider two industries, denoted I and II, which have the same structural
characteristics except for their entry costs. In particular, assume that in both
industries consumers are willing to spend 100 (dollar, say) in total. Consumers’





where qji denotes product i in industry j and Nj denotes the number of prod-
ucts in industry j (= I,II). Further, assume that in both industries output is
produced with a constant returns to scale technology using only labor, where
the wage is normalized to 1 (one). Eﬃciency (or productivity) n is deﬁned as
the amount of output produced by one unit of labor. Assume that n in both
industries is distributed uniformly on [0,10]. Finally, the entry cost in industry
I equals γI =3 1and in industry II it equals γII =1 5 0 . Now you are told that
industry proﬁts (sum of proﬁts of all ﬁrms in the industry minus the entry costs
paid) in industry I equal 18.21 and in industry II they equal 0.72. Further,
in industry I ﬁrms with productivity above 3.52 are active and in industry II
ﬁrms with productivity above 3.55 are active. Which of these two industries
should a competition authority target for further examination?1 Guided by the
ﬁrst best benchmark, a number of people may choose to target industry I:e n -
try costs are lower than in II while industry proﬁts are a lot higher. Deﬁning
an entry barrier as the amount of industry proﬁts that can be sustained in ex-
cess of the entry cost, clearly entry barriers are higher in industry I than they
are in II. Moreover, in industry I almost 20% of total expenditure goes into
ﬁrms’ pockets as net proﬁts. However, using this intuition to decide on which
sector the competition authority should focus its attention is incorrect! As we
will show below, the industry outcome and proﬁts in industry I are identical
to the optimal competition outcome. Hence no intervention by the competition
authority will reduce these industry proﬁts.2 In industry II, however, compe-
1Clearly one would need more information than just industry proﬁts to make this decision.
And below we will introduce the example in more detail. However, for illustrative purposes
the information given is suﬃcient to make the point.
2That is to say, no intervention which does not reduce welfare. Clearly, if the competition
authority would introduce a maximum price just above 1
10 (marginal cost level of the most
2tition is ineﬃciently weak. That also explains why industry II attracts almost
the same number of ﬁrms as industry I while its entry costs are considerably
higher. The optimal competition outcome in industry II diﬀers from the out-
come described above. Therefore, it is better to target industry II because
there the competition authority can make a diﬀerence and raise welfare.
The optimal competition benchmark introduced here is the solution to a
mechanism design problem, where the designer does not observe ﬁrms’ eﬃ-
ciency levels but does know the distribution of these costs. In particular, the
mechanism oﬀers a menu of contracts with diﬀerent output-revenue options.
Firms then self-select their optimal output-revenue combination based on their
eﬃciency level. In other words, the diﬀerence with the ﬁrst best outcome is
that the optimal competition benchmark does not assume that a competition
authority will be able to observe ﬁrms’ eﬃciency levels. This assumption seems
natural and is, in fact, the standard assumption in mechanism design problems.
An obvious criticism is that even the solution to this mechanism design
problem may be more than a competition authority may hope to achieve. Our
response to this criticism are the following three arguments. First, in an industry
context it is not unreasonable to assume that information is available on ﬁrms’
eﬃciency distribution and consumers’ utility function. In fact, an important
part of the empirical literature (see Reiss and Wolak (2002) for a survey) is
devoted to estimating industries’ cost and demand structures. In other words,
the informational problems may not be worse here than in other mechanism
design problems, like regulating a monopolist or designing optimal auctions.
Second, it may seem far fetched to have a competition authority oﬀering a
menu of choices from which ﬁrms must choose, however, this is beside the point.
To illustrate, consider the optimal tax literature. Although, to the best of our
knowledge, no government has ever proposed a tax code given by the diﬀerential
equation that follows from an optimal tax problem, a lot has been learned from
the optimal tax literature on how taxes should be designed. Below we will derive
a number of properties of optimal competition, which will be surprising to people
using the ﬁrst best benchmark. For instance, we will derive conditions under
which Cournot competition is, in fact, optimal competition. Since we allow
for a set of mechanisms which may seem to be stretching what is realistically
feasible, this is a very strong result indeed. Third, worrying about the feasibility
of the optimal competition benchmark goes to the core of this paper: our point
is exactly that using the ﬁrst best outcome as a benchmark is not helpful. It is
not realistic to assume that a competition authority can intervene in a way that
will create the ﬁrst best outcome in an industry. Hence optimal competition is
a ﬁrst step toward a better benchmark for competition authorities. In the light
of the mechanism design literature it is a natural step, but it need not be the
last step.
The main motivation of the paper is the optimal competition benchmark as
a tool for competition authorities to help them select which industries require
eﬃcient ﬁrm), industry proﬁts would be lower. But, as shown below, welfare would be lower
as well.
3further investigation. However, there are broader lessons that can be learned
from the optimal competition outcome. This paper makes the following ﬁve
additional contributions to the Industrial Organization literature.
First, the economic analysis of the eﬀects of intensity of competition on wel-
fare is rather complex. We will ﬁrst explain where this complexity comes from
and then how this paper contributes to this issue. When modelling the eﬀect
of competition on welfare there are, broadly speaking, two ways in which com-
petition can be intensiﬁed. First, one can increase the number of ﬁrms in the
industry. This is the route taken in papers, like Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
Mankiw and Whinston (1986). These papers derive the optimal number of ﬁrms
(or optimal product variety) in an industry with given competitive behavior (say,
Cournot competition). Another way in which competition can be intensiﬁed is
more aggressive interaction between existing ﬁrms. The way in which this is
often formalized is by increasing the elasticity of substitution between goods
(see, for instance, Aghion et. al. (2002) and Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001)).
This, however, implies changing the consumers’ utility function. Thus welfare
comparisons become hazardous. Another option to model more aggressive in-
teraction (without aﬀecting agents’ utility function) is a switch from Cournot to
Bertrand competition. This approach has two disadvantages. It is rather messy
in terms of the mathematics and it only considers two possibilities instead of
working with a continuum.3
A major contribution of this paper is that by viewing the problem as a
mechanism design problem we both generalize the modelling of competition
outcomes4 and we manage to make the mathematics simpler. The innovation
is the identiﬁcation of intensity of competition in a mechanism design problem.
In this way, we determine the optimal number of ﬁrms and the optimal inten-
sity of competition using a simple two dimensional graph with two curves: a
downwardsloping budget constraint and an upwardsloping entry condition.
The second contribution of the paper is the following. People guided by the
ﬁrst best benchmark tend to believe that prices should be equal (or at least
close) to marginal cost. This leads them to believe that Bertrand competition is
always preferable to Cournot competition from a welfare perspective. Although
Bertrand competition is welfare maximizing in the case where ﬁrms produce
perfect substitutes, this is not the case when consumers value variety. We will
show that in the case where consumers’ utility function is of the CES form (with
a ﬁnite elasticity of substitution) and the eﬃciency distribution in an industry
follows the Pareto distribution, Cournot competition can be optimal. Moreover,
we will show that if the least eﬃcient ﬁrms cannot enter the market, Cournot
competition is, in fact, too ﬁerce. Welfare would be increased if competition
3One way in which one can introduce a continuous variable here is to model the, so called,
conjectural variations. However, this approach has its own limitations (no clear foundation
for where the ﬁrms’ conjectures come from) and it is rather messy as well.
4More formally, let q(.) denote a ﬁrm’s output level as a function of its eﬃciency level, n.
Then comparing the Cournot and Bertrand competition outcomes boils down to calculating
welfare under two speciﬁc functional forms, qB (.) and qC (.), determined by the Bertrand
Nash and Cournot Nash equilibrium resp. In contrast, below we consider any functional form
q (.) that satisﬁes incentive compatibility.
4would become less intense, because then more ﬁrms could enter the industry
with diﬀerentiated products.
Third, this idea that competition in the market can be too ﬁerce from a
social point of view is an important conceptual contribution. To illustrate,
Bolton et al. (2000) state that ’Predatory pricing poses a dilemma that has
perplexed and intrigued the antitrust community for many years. On the one
hand, ... predatory pricing can be an instrument of abuse; on the other hand,
price reductions are the hallmark of competition and the tangible beneﬁt that
consumers perhaps most desire from the economic system’. The idea implicit in
this dilemma is that more competition is always better from a welfare point of
view. Bolton et al. (2000) survey how predatory pricing can indeed be optimal
for a ﬁrm and welfare reducing in a dynamic world with incomplete information.
However, we will show below that competition can be too ﬁerce also in a static
context with symmetric information among ﬁrms. Thus one can formalize that
ﬁrms may have to be punished for competing too ﬁercely as well as for lack
of competition. Comparing the optimal competition outcome with the market
outcome yields that the monopoly power eﬀect causes too little output and
the appropriability eﬀect too little entry in the market outcome. On the other
hand, the rent creation eﬀect leads to excessive production and entry levels in
the market outcome as compared to the optimal competition outcome.
One can also relate this issue to a competition authority’s task of approving
mergers. Consider a certain industry where the market outcome is more com-
petitive than the optimal competition outcome. Then a merger that reduces
the intensity of competition can be welfare enhancing. Hence a competition
authority should take a more favourable stance towards such a merger in this
case than in an industry where the market outcome is less competitive than the
optimal outcome.
Fourth, we derive the following comparative static results. As the amount
of money spent in the industry goes up, the optimal competition outcome be-
comes more competitive. This suggests that, ceteris paribus, a competition au-
thority should spend more resources monitoring mature industries than starting
industries. Further, as competition authorities put more weight in their objec-
tive function on consumer surplus (as compared to producer surplus) and more
weight on employment, the outcome should become more competitive. The em-
ployment eﬀect may be surprising as competition authorities often claim that
they allow soft competition in an industry to protect employment. This ar-
gument overlooks that low competitive pressure creates rents thereby reducing
output and therefore employment. Finally, the relation between the level of
the sunk entry cost and the intensity of competition in the optimal outcome is
U-shaped.
Finally, the optimal competition benchmark allows us to derive suﬃcient
conditions under which regulating a monopolist is preferrable to liberalizing
the industry and inviting entry. Without the optimal competition concept, it
is hard to derive such suﬃcient conditions because there is no upperbound on
welfare achievable in the market outcome. To illustrate, one can show that
regulating the monopolist leads to higher welfare than a market outcome with
5Cournot competition. But that does not prove much as it leaves open the
question whether there are other market outcomes (like Bertrand competition)
that yield higher welfare than the regulation outcome. Optimal competition
yields (by deﬁnition) the highest welfare that any market outcome can achieve.
Hence, showing that the regulated outcome leads to higher welfare than optimal
competition makes a strong case for regulation.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, the optimal
competition benchmark is derived as the solution to a mechanism design prob-
lem. In particular, it is reminiscent of the literature on optimal auctions, see for
instance Bulow and Roberts (1989) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996), and the
optimal allocation of prizes in a contest as in Moldovanu and Sela (2001). This
will become even more clear lateron when we introduce the notion of industry
marginal costs (as compared to an individual ﬁrm’s marginal costs) which is
closely related to marginal revenue in auctions. The diﬀerence with optimal
auctions is that we maximize welfare, not revenue. Second, the eﬃciency distri-
bution is the realized distribution of the ﬁrms in the industry. That is, it is not a
probability distribution from which agents are drawn. Finally, ﬁrms pay a sunk
entry cost to enter the industry and hence the number of ﬁrms is determined
endogenously. In Bulow and Roberts (1989) the number of participants in the
auction is exogenously given.
Second, the result that an increase in sunk entry costs can reduce the in-
tensity of competition in the optimal outcome is similar to a result by Gilbert
and Klemperer (2000). They show that because of a sunk entry cost for buyers
it may be optimal ex ante for a seller to commit to rationing. In particular,
in this case competition is reduced (rationing instead of market clearing prices)
by the seller to encourage entry by weak (low valuation) buyers. We generalize
this idea by considering the optimal competition outcome as a function of the
entry cost and ﬁnd a U-shaped relationship.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces
the model, deﬁnes the optimal competition outcome and represents the solution
in a simple diagram. Section 3 derives the implications for competition policy
of the optimal competition benchmark. Section 4 compares the optimal com-
petition outcome with a market outcome and derives conditions under which
they coincide. Section 5 discusses three extensions of the basic model. What
happens to the optimal competition benchmark if the competition authority at-
taches value to producer surplus and employment? When should deregulation
in one market spill over into more intense competition in another market? And,
ﬁnally, when is regulating a monopolist better from a social point of view than
breaking up the monopoly and inviting entry into the industry? Mathematical
proofs are given in the appendix.
2M o d e l
This section formalizes the concept optimal competition. It is the solution to
a mechanism design problem where ﬁrms’ eﬃciency levels cannot be observed.
6A competition authority oﬀers a menu of output and revenue combinations and
ﬁrms select the most proﬁtable combination. The diﬀerence between the optimal
competition benchmark and the ﬁrst best is precisely the assumption that ﬁrms’
eﬃciency levels cannot be observed. Hence under optimal competition, the
competition authority cannot force ﬁrms to price at marginal costs. Since it
seems indeed unrealistic to assume that a competition authority can observe
ﬁrms’ marginal cost levels, the optimal competition outcome gives a better
benchmark for authorities to decide which sectors should be scrutinized. We
ﬁrst introduce the demand side of the economy and then the supply side.
Consider an economy with sectors j ∈ [0,1] where each sector consists of a
number of ﬁrms producing goods. Consumers have a nested utility structure




where Q(j) is a utility index for sector j,w i t hα(j) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [0,1] and ￿ 1





where qj (i) is the output level of ﬁrm i in industry j and the function v (.)
satisﬁes v (0) = 0,v￿(q) > 0 and v￿￿ (q) ≤ 0.I fv￿￿ (q) < 0 we say consumers have
a taste for variety, while products are perfect substitutes if v￿￿(q)=0 .L e tY
denote aggregate income that is spent on consumption in this economy. Then
the Cobb Douglas structure gives us that expenditure in market j is given by
Ej = α(j)Y . This assumption allows us to consider each industry in isolation
without worrying about spillover eﬀects to other industries (we come back to
this in section 5). Below we focus on one industry j and drop the subscript j
where this does not cause confusion.
Now turn to the ﬁrm side in the industry. Each ﬁrm produces one and only
one product. Each ﬁrm has a constant returns to scale technology. Let n denote
the productivity of a ﬁrm, that is the marginal cost of producing an additional
unit equals 1
n. We assume that n is distributed on [n0,n 1] with density function
f (.) and distribution function F (.). Further, in order to enter the industry each
ﬁrm has to pay a sunk entry cost γ ≥ 0.
The mechanism design problem is to determine the menu of contracts which
maximizes utility or consumer surplus under the restriction that total expen-
diture in the industry equals E. In particular, the planner oﬀers combinations
(R(n),q(n)) of revenue R(n) and output levels q(n). Firms announce their
eﬃciency level in such a way that they get the combination of revenue and out-
put level that maximizes their proﬁts.5 Consider incentive compatibility and
individual rationality in turn.
5Using the revelation principle (see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: chapter 7)) we
can indeed focus, without loss of generality, on such a direct mechanism where ﬁrms announce
their type.
7Once a ﬁrm of type n enters the market, it announces its eﬃciency level ˜ n








As shown by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991: 258-261) and Guesnerie and Laﬀont
(1984) a necessary and suﬃcient condition for truthful revelation in this case
is that R(.) and q(.) are nondecreasing in n.I f R(.) and q(.) are strictly
increasing in n, we have full separation of types.6 Given that we have truthful




Next consider individual rationality. Firms enter the market if and only
if their proﬁts exceed the entry cost γ, π (n) ≥ γ. Since quantities q(n) are
nonnegative, equation (2) implies that proﬁts are nondecreasing in n. Hence,
if type n enters the market, all types n￿ >nenter as well. Let nw denote the
least eﬃcient ﬁrm that enters the market. Then the proﬁts for ﬁrm n can be
written as follows.
Lemma 1 Consider an incentive compatible menu of choices (R(.),q(.)) for
ﬁrms. If ﬁrm nw >n 0 is the least eﬃcient ﬁrm to enter the market,7 then the






The proof of the lemma is straightforward. First, since ﬁrms enter the market
freely, it must be the case that π(nw) ≥ γ. Next, the case where π(nw) >γ
can be ruled out because in that case ﬁrms with eﬃciency nw − ε (for ε>0
but small) would enter the market as well,8 contradicting that nw is the least
eﬃcient ﬁrm to enter the market. Hence we have π(nw)=γ. Second, equation
(2) with π(nw)=γ is a diﬀerential equation with a boundary condition, and it
is routine to verify that (3) is the solution.
We ﬁrst assume that the competition authority’s goal is maximization of con-
sumer surplus and lateron we consider other objectives. Thus we can formulate






6We will ignore this monotonicity condition in the derivation of the outcome and check
lateron that the solution indeed satisﬁes this condition.
7If nw = n0 the result still holds if the competition authority puts enough weight on
consumer surplus (as compared to producer surplus) because that will imply π (nw)=γ
(instead of π (nw) >γ ).
8To see this, note that R(nw) −
q(nw)
















f (n)dn = E
Note that now we index ﬁrms by their eﬃciency level (i.e. not by their identity
i ∈ [0,N] as above). The ﬁrst and second constraint have been discussed above.
T h el a s tc o n s t r a i n ti st h a tt o t a le x p e n d i t u r e ,
￿ n1
nw R(n)f (n)dn,i nt h em a r k e t
is equal to E,9 where R(n)=π(n)+
q(n)
n .L e tλ denote the Lagrange multiplier
on this budget constraint, then this optimization problem can be formulated as
follows.





[v(q(n))−λMC (n)q(n)]f (n)dn − λ(1 − F (nw))γ
subject to ￿ n1
nw
MC(n)q(n)f (n)dn +(1− F (nw))γ = E










The lemma shows that the competition authority’s optimization problem has
a very simple structure. It maximizes utility, v(q(n)), minus total variable costs
of production, MC(n)q(n), minus total entry costs, (1 − F (nw))γ, where the
costs are priced with the shadowprice, λ, of expenditure E. The deﬁnition of
industry marginal costs in (4) is borrowed from the auction literature’s concept
marginal revenue.10 To see why industry marginal costs for ﬁrm n, MC(n),
exceed private marginal cost for ﬁrm n, 1
n, consider the industry cost of raising
output for ﬁrms with eﬃciency n with one unit, i.e. ∆q(n)=1 .T h a ti m p l i e s




n . In addition to
this, it becomes more attractive for ﬁrms with n￿ >nto mimic ﬁrm n.I n
order to keep incentive compatibility, equation (2) implies that the proﬁts of
9S i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dn o n - s a t i a t i o n( v￿ (q) > 0 for all q ≥ 0), total expenditure will
never be less than E.
10See, for instance, Bulow and Roberts (1989) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996)). Their
motivation for calling it (industry) marginal costs is the following. Let x(n) denote the
’quantity’ of ﬁrms with eﬃciency greater than n,t h a ti sx(n)=1 −F (n). Then marginal costs
at the industry level can be deﬁned as
d[ 1
n x(n)]








it is routine to verify that this expression equals that for MC(n) in equation (4).
9the ﬁrm just above n has to rise with ∆π =
∆q(n)
n2 = 1
n2. Further, to maintain
incentive compatibility for all ﬁrms above n, the proﬁts of these ﬁrms have to
rise as well with ∆π. Since there are (1 −F (n)) ﬁrms above n, the total costs
of maintaining incentive compatibility equal ∆π(1 − F (n)) =
1−F(n)
n2 .H e n c e










This explains the intuition why industry marginal costs exceed marginal
costs 1
n at the ﬁrm level. By letting ﬁrm n produce an additional unit, an
informational rent (or virtual surplus) is created for types n￿ >n . The industry
marginal costs MC(n) takes this informational rent into account as well.
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the maximization
problem above. That is, it characterizes the optimal competition outcome.
Proposition 1 Assume that MC(n) is non-increasing in n,n0 =0 ,γ>0,v￿￿(.) <
0 and limq−→ +∞ v￿(q)=0 .T h e nq(.),n w and λ are determined by the following
three equations
v￿ (q(n)) = λMC (n) (5)
for all n ≥ nw,
v(q(nw)) = λ[q(nw)MC(nw)+γ] (6)
￿ n1
nw
MC(n)q(n)f (n)dn +( 1−F (nw))γ = E (7)
The proposition shows the trade oﬀ that a competition authority faces. On
the one hand, the concavity of the utility function v (.) implies that consumers
like variety and hence nw should be low. However, a low value of nw is costly not
only because the entry cost γ has to be incurred for a bigger number of ﬁrms but
also because entry by low eﬃciency ﬁrms creates rents for more eﬃcient ﬁrms
(MC(n) goes up as n falls). Hence to keep a balanced budget, lower values of
nw lead to lower values of q(n) for all n>n w. In other words, the trade oﬀ here
is between variety (number of goods) and the quantity of each good on oﬀer.
The intuition for the equations (5)-(7) is as follows. The ﬁrst equates the
marginal utility of output q(n) with its marginal cost (in terms of the shadow
price of expenditure). Equation (6) says that the beneﬁt of having the least
eﬃcient ﬁrm nw in the industry, v (q(nw)), equals the cost of having it in the
industry γ plus the cost of producing q(nw), λ[q(nw)MC(nw)+γ]. Put diﬀer-
ently, the planner is indiﬀerent whether nw enters the industry or not. Finally,
total industry costs (total variable production costs plus entry costs) should
equal total expenditure E.
The intuition for the assumptions made in the proposition is the following.
A suﬃcient condition for MC(n) to be decreasing in n is that the distribution of






≥ 0.T h i s
10is a standard condition in mechanism design problems. If the eﬃciency distri-
bution is such that industry marginal costs are rising in n over some interval,
we get that more eﬃcient types produce less than less eﬃcient types. This con-
tradicts incentive compatibility of the solution.11 The condition that n0 =0
ensures that we have an interior solution for nw. Clearly, with γ>0 it is never
optimal to let a ﬁrm which cannot produce any output enter an industry, so
nw >n 0 =0 .I fn0 > 0, equation (6) needs to be adjusted to allow for a corner
solution.12 The condition that utility v (.) is strictly concave, rules out that
goods are perfect substitutes. If goods are perfect substitutes, the solution to
the planner’s optimization problem is not well deﬁned. In principle, in that case
it is optimal to have only the most eﬃcient ﬁrms enter the industry, nw = n1.
However, the ﬁrms with eﬃciency n1 have zero mass and hence industry produc-
tion equals zero.13 Assuming that consumers value variety (v￿￿(.) < 0)a v o i d s
this technical complication. Finally, assuming that v￿(+∞)=0ensures that
we do not need to worry about corner solutions in equation (5).14
The outcome in proposition 1 can be represented by two curves in (nw,λ)








MC(nw)+γ > 0. We call this the entry condition (EC): as
the marginal value of income, λ, decreases then less eﬃcient ﬁrms can enter as
well and nw falls. We call equation (7) the budget constraint (BC). This curve









dλ MC(n)f(n)dn < 0 because
equation (5) implies
dq(n)
dλ < 0. As the marginal value of income decreases,
high eﬃciency ﬁrms’ production goes up and hence to satisfy the budget con-
straint (7) money has to be saved on production and entry costs by eliminating
ineﬃcient ﬁrms from the industry (nw goes up).
With an upward sloping EC and downward sloping BC curve in (nw,λ)
space, we have three possibilities as illustrated in ﬁgure 1. Panel a describes
t h ec a s ew i t ha ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o nf o rnw as characterized in proposition 1. In
panel b we ﬁnd that at the point (n0,λBC) i ti st h ec a s et h a tv (q(n0)) >
λBC [q(n0)MC(n0)+γ]. Thus here we get the corner solution nw = n0.F i -
nally, panel c of ﬁgure 1 describes a situation where the industry closes down
11Interestingly, in this case the solution to the competition authority’s optimization problem
involves bunching or rationing. This means that ﬁrms of diﬀerent eﬃciency levels get the same
output and revenue combinations. Put diﬀerently, optimal competition in that case involves
(over some range of types n)the weakest competition possible: more eﬃcient ﬁrms are not
rewarded by higher market shares (but they do have higher proﬁts). This line of research is
not further pursued in this paper.
12In particular, it would read v (q (nw)) ≥ λ [q (nw)MC(nw)+γ] with strict inequality
only if nw = n0. For instance, it is routine to verify that v￿￿ (q) < 0,γ =0and n0 > 0 imply
nw = n0.
13Formally, the solution can be characterized as nw = n1−ε with ε>0 as small as possible.
The value of ε has to be as close to zero as possible in order to have only the most productive
ﬁrms in the industry and hence reduce both industry marginal costs and entry costs.
14Note that we do not need the assumption that limq↓0 v￿ (q)=+ ∞ to rule out corner
solutions. If v￿ (0) is ﬁnite, and equation (5)would imply that q (ˆ n)=0for some ˆ n,t h e n
equation (6)would imply that nw > ˆ n.
11as nw >n 1. This case can be ruled out by the assumption that the inverse of
the function v￿ (.) is ﬁnite valued on ￿+.15
3 Implications for competition policy
This section interprets the results in proposition 1 in terms of optimal compe-
tition and considers some simple examples. To do this, we introduce a formal
deﬁnition of competition in this context. We identify competition by its out-
put reallocation eﬀect (see, for instance, Boone (2001) or Vickers (1995)). The
idea is that a rise in competition reallocates output from less eﬃcient to more
eﬃcient ﬁrms. From this point of view, the ultimate uncompetitive outcome is
rationing (each ﬁrm produces the same output level)16 not monopoly. In fact, a
highly concentrated industry is associated here with competition that is so in-
tense that less eﬃcient ﬁrms cannot enter. More formally, we deﬁne competition
as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 Consider an industry characterized by its eﬃciency distribution
f (n) on an interval [n0,n 1]. Comparing two industry outcomes, denoted I and
II, we say that outcome I is more competitive than II if there exists ¯ n ∈￿ n0,n 1￿
such that
qI (n) >q II (n) for all n>¯ n
qI (n) ≤ qII (n) for all n<¯ n and
qI (n) <q II (n) for all n<¯ n with qII (n) > 0
This deﬁnition says that industry outcome I is more competitive than II if
there is a pivotal eﬃciency level ¯ n such that all ﬁrms above ¯ n produce more in
outcome I than in II while the ﬁrms below ¯ n produce less in outcome I than in
II. Clearly, if qII (n)=0for low eﬃciency levels a rise in competition cannot
reduce these output levels further. Figure 2 illustrates this deﬁnition graphically.
In panels a and b the outcome in industry I is more competitive than in II.
Note however that the deﬁnition does not imply a complete ordering of industry
outcomes in terms of which outcome is more competitive. This is illustrated in
ﬁgure 2c where the outcomes I and II cannot be ranked. Yet, for our purposes
here that turns out not to pose any problems. That is, although we use this weak
criterion, we can rank the outcomes in terms of competition intensity where we
want to do so. The following example illustrates the deﬁnition by comparing a
Cournot and Bertrand outcome, where the Betrand outcome is generally seen
as more competitive.
15To see this, note that this implies q(n) as determined by equation (5)with λ = λBC > 0
is ﬁnite valued. Therefore the left hand side of equation (7)goes to zero as nw goes to n1 and
equation (7)cannot hold at the point (n1,λBC). This rules out the case where the BC curve
lies everywhere above the EC curve.
16Note that incenitive compatibility excludes the case where more eﬃcient ﬁrms produce
lower output levels than less eﬃcient ﬁrms.
12Example 1 Consider an industry with two ﬁrms producing perfect substitues
where the demand curve is given by p =1− q1 − q2. Assume that the con-
stant marginal costs of ﬁrm 1 equal c1 =0while the marginal costs of 2 equal
c2 = c<1





3 and price level pC = 1+c
3 . The Bertrand outcome has
qB
1 =1− c,qB
2 =0and price level pC = c. Using deﬁnition 1 we say that






Using this example we can also illustrate why variables like concentration and
industry proﬁts are not useful to measure competition. First, the switch from
Cournot to Betrand competition is a move from duopoly to monopoly. Hence
competition goes up and concentration as well. Next, consider industry prof-











and under Bertrand competition ΠB =( 1− c)c. It is routine to
verify that ΠB > ΠC for c ∈￿ 2
7, 1
2￿.
Boone (2001) shows that for well known parametrizations of competition,
an increase in competition always features the output reallocation eﬀect. The
intuition is that in a more competitive environment ﬁrms are punished more
harshly (in terms of output) for a fall in eﬃciency. Although this notion of
competition is, in general, not directly related to price cost margins, in the case
considered here there is a clear relationship as shown below.
The following result gives a straightforward way to determine how competi-
tive the optimal competition outcome is.
Lemma 3 The shadow price of expenditure λ is an inverse measure of compe-
tition.
This result follows immediately from equations (5) and (7). As λ falls,
output q(n) rises for all active ﬁrms (since v￿￿ (.) < 0) and hence equation (7)
implies that nw rises. Hence, using deﬁnition 1, the outcome with lower λ is
more competitive. As a further motivation for using λ as a measure competition
consider the following comparative static results which are partial results since
we vary λ as an exogenous variable.17







v￿(q2) can be written as a function of
q1











for all n ≥ nw.
17More precisly, q (n) is determined by (5)and nw is determined by the budget constraint
(7).
13Hence a fall in λ reduces the proﬁts of the least eﬃcient ﬁrm by reducing
its production level through the reallocation eﬀect. A rise in competition (and
af a l li nλ) does not necessarily reduce all ﬁrms’ proﬁts since the most eﬃcient
ﬁrms may gain from more aggressive competitive interaction in the industry.
Further, a fall in λ reduces price cost margins for all active ﬁrms which is




v￿(q2) can be written as a function of
q1
q2 only is, for instance, satisﬁed if
the utility function is given by v (q)= 1
αqα (implying a CES utility function at
the industry level).
Using ﬁgure 1a, we can derive the eﬀects of entry cost γ and expenditure E
on the optimal intensity of competition λ and entry nw. As expenditure goes
up, the budget constraint shifts to the left: for given intensity of competition
more ﬁrms can enter. Hence the eﬀect of a rise in E i saf a l li nb o t hλ and nw.
If consumers are willing to spend more, the competition authority can aﬀord to
have both more intense competition and more varieties.
A rise in entry cost γ s h i f t sb o t hc u r v e st ot h er i g h t . Fo rg i v e ni n t e n s i t y
of competition, λ, both the entry condition and the budget constraint indicate
that less ﬁrms can enter the industry (that is, nw goes up). The eﬀect of γ on
λ depends on relative slopes of the two curves.
Lemma 5 The eﬀect of a rise in the amount E spent in the industry on the



















q(nw)[−MC￿(nw)] > 0 as determined by equation (6).
The ﬁrst result can be seen as a formalization of the following two forms
of an infant industry argument. First, an industry that starts oﬀ in a country
has a relatively low share of total income Y spent on its goods (i.e. α(j)
is low in equation (1)). Hence, ceteris paribus the eﬃciency distribution in
the industry and the entry cost, such a starting industry should be relatively
less competitive than a mature industry which attracts a higher share of total
income Y . In other words, the optimal competition benchmark is indeed tighter
(λ is lower) for mature industries than for infant industries. In this sense, for
given competitive behavior in the market, a competition authority should pay
more attention to the mature than the infant industry. Similarly, considering
an industry moving from maturity into decline in the sense that the amount
of money spent in the industry decreases over time, the optimal competition
14outcome becomes less intense. Hence competition reducing mergers should be
viewed more favourably by a competition authority in a declining industry than
in a mature industry.
Second, comparing the same industry (with the same share of total income
spent in the industry) in two countries where one country is more developed
than the other in terms of income Y , we ﬁnd that the less developed country
has a less competitive optimal competition benchmark than the more developed
country. This shows that the claim that developing countries should have the
same competition standards as developed western countries is, in general, not
correct.18
The interpretation of the condition for dλ
dγ is the following. As γ goes up,
the eﬀect on λ is determined by the overall eﬀect on the budget constraint.
On the one hand, as γ goes up with 1 expenditure on entry costs for all types
n>n w goes up. This is the term [1 −F (nw)]. On the other hand, equation
(6) implies that a rise in γ increases nw because a higher eﬃciency is needed
to pass the (now) tougher entry condition. Clearly, the rise in nw reduces total
expenditure. The higher the savings due to the rise in nw, i.e. the higher
f (nw)[γ +q(nw)MC(nw)] ∂nw
∂γ , the more likely that more intense competition
can be aﬀorded, dλ
dγ < 0. If total costs rise with the increase in γ, competition
becomes less intense in order to lower active ﬁrms’ output levels and keep the
budget constraint satisﬁed.
The condition for the sign of ∂nw
∂γ suggests that for low γ the eﬀect is pos-
itive because nw is small and hence [1 − F (nw)] is big. Then as γ is raised
[1 −F (nw)] falls and the eﬀect becomes negative. More formally this can be
described as follows.
Corollary 1 Assume n0 > 0, v￿￿ (.) < 0 and limq↓0 v￿ (q)=+ ∞.Th e n t h e r e
exist γ∗,γ∗ with γ∗ <γ ∗ such that
dλ
dγ




< 0 for γ>γ ∗
The intuition for this result is as follows. If γ is low, most ﬁrms can enter
and the post entry game can be rather competitive without damaging variety
much. If γ is big, duplication of entry costs is too expensive and hence not too
many ﬁrms should be attracted to the industry. Consequently, the post entry
game should be rather competitive. It is only when entry costs are somewhere
in between that weakening competition makes sense. The goal of softening
competition is to attract more ﬁrms into the industry (at the expense of lower
output per ﬁrm) which raises welfare because consumers value variety.
18Yet, it does not necessary follow that the reduction in competition in developing countries
should take the protectionist form of introducing import tariﬀs for competing foreign goods.
15Another interpretation of this result is in terms of the uncertainty surround-
ing the industry. Consider the following modiﬁcation of the model above. A
ﬁrm invests γ in R&D to invent a new product and enter the industry. With
ap r o b a b i l i t y(1−s) this investment is not successful and the ﬁrm earns noth-
ing. With probability s the new product is successfully introduced and the
ﬁrm earns proﬁts as stated above. It is routine to verify that results of this
new model are the same as the results derived above with sunk costs
γ
s.H e n c e
af a l li ns (making R&D more risky for ﬁrms) may initially call for a fall in
competition. Eventually for low values of s further reductions in s should raise
competition. This goes against the Schumpeterian intuition that more risk in
the R&D process should lead to more monopoly power for ﬁrms. The reason is
that for low s the R&D is unlikely to be successful and it is eﬃcient to limit the
number of ﬁrms undertaking R&D by raising competition. An in-depth analysis
of the eﬀects of R&D on optimal competition is beyond the scope of this paper
and left for future research.
The U-shaped relation between competition and entry cost is illustrated in
the following example.
Example 2 Assume that eﬃciency has a uniform distribution on [0,n 1].Th a t
is, f (n)= 1
n1 and F (n)= n
n1. It follows that MC(n)=n1
n2. If we assume that
v (q)= 1
























































Figure 3 plots Π,n w and λ as a function of γ. We have chosen the following
parameter values for this graph: α = 1
2,E=1 0 0 ,n 1 =1 0and γ ∈ [1,500].N o t e
that we ﬁnd indeed the inverse-U relation between γ and λ suggested above.
Hence, as γ rises competition becomes less intense in the optimal competition
benchmark while for higher values of γ ar i s ei nγ intensiﬁes competition in the
benchmark.
The example given in the introduction also follows from this example. In in-
dustry I the entry cost equals γI =3 1 , then it follows that nw =3 .52,λ=0 .20
16and Π=1 8 .21.I ni n d u s t r yII the entry cost γII = 150 and thus the optimal
competition outcome features nw =7 .25,λ =0 .19 and Π=7 .23. The out-
come presented in the introduction has been derived with λ
m =1and hence
qm (n)= n4







.F i n a l l y , nm



















dt. Although industry proﬁts equal Πm =0 .72
in the market outcome, which is below Π=7 .23 in the optimal competition
benchmark for industry II, it is clearly the case that the market outcome is less
competitive
As another illustration, the next example considers the optimal competition
benchmark for the case where the eﬃciency distribution is a Pareto distribution.
Example 3 Assume that the eﬃciency distribution on [n0,+∞￿ (with n0 > 0)
















Further, assume that the function v (.) takes the form v(q)= 1
αqα for α>0.






























































19Since the Pareto distribution is unbounded at the top it is tempting to produce output
only with the ﬁrms that have 1
n =0 . This solution, however, is not optimal if consumers value
variety. The condition 1−α
α >φsays that consumers value variety more than the tail of the
eﬃciency distribution is thick for high n. Hence it is optimal to have nw ∈￿and 1
nw > 0.































































Using this example it becomes relatively straightforward to illustrate the
comparison between the optimal competition benchmark and the Cournot mar-
ket outcome.
4 Comparing optimal competition with the mar-
ket outcome: Cournot case
In this section we compare the optimal competition outcome with the market
outcome in case of Cournot competition. We show that three eﬀects determine
the diﬀerence between the optimal and market outcome: monopoly power eﬀect,
appropriability eﬀect and rent creation eﬀect. These eﬀects work in opposite
directions and hence it is not a priori clear whether the optimal competition
outcome is more competitive than the Cournot outcome. Looking at the exam-
ple of a CES utility function and Pareto eﬃciency distribution we show that for
γ suﬃciently high the Cournot outcome is too competitive.
4.1 General case
First, we derive the demand function that a ﬁrm faces under Cournot compe-
tition. Consumers maximize utility under the budget constraint that they are








p(n)q(n)f (n)dn = E
where p(n) denotes the price of a good produced by a ﬁrm with eﬃciency n.20
Let µ denote the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint, then the ﬁrst
order condition for q(n) can be written as
v
￿ (q(n)) = µp(n)




and ﬁrms view µ as an exogenous parameter that their output decisions do not
aﬀect. The Lagrange multiplier µ is determined by the budget constraint which




q(n)f (n)dn = E
where nc denotes the least eﬃcient ﬁrm that still produces under Cournot com-
petition (to be determined below). Note that under Cournot competition ﬁrms
are right that they cannot aﬀect µ in the sense that their own direct eﬀect on
the budget constraint is negligible and they conjecture that
dq(n)
dq(i) =0for n ￿= i.
























C o m p a r i n gt h i se q u a t i o nt oe q u a t i o n( 5 )w h i c hd e t e r m i n e so u t p u to fﬁ r mn
under optimal competition we see two diﬀerences. First, on the left hand side
the Cournot outcome features the term v￿￿(q(n))q(n) < 0 which does not
appear in the optimal competition benchmark. This is the monopoly power
eﬀect that tends to reduce output in the private outcome as compared to the
optimal competition benchmark. Firms take into account that increasing output




µ < 0). On the right
hand side of (14) we ﬁnd the private marginal cost 1
n instead of the industry
marginal cost MC(n) in (5). Since MC(n) > 1
n this tends to raise output in the
20Note that to simplify notation we have used that ﬁrms with the same eﬃciency level
choose the same price-output combination in a (symmetric) Cournot equilibrium.
19private outcome above output in the optimal competition benchmark. We call
this the rent creation eﬀect. Low eﬃciency ﬁrms tend to produce too much in
the private outcome thereby raising the rents that accrue to more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
In order to understand the overall eﬀect (including the eﬀect on µ)w en e e dt o
derive the least eﬃcient ﬁrm nc that still enters in the Cournot outcome. This
is determined as the eﬃciency level at which a ﬁrm generates enough proﬁts to















and comparing this equation with (6) we see two eﬀects appearing. On the right
hand side we have again the rent creation eﬀect: MC(n) > 1
n:b ye n t e r i n ga
ﬁrm creates additional rents for ﬁrms with higher eﬃciency as they can now
mimic this ﬁrm. Hence in the private outcome there tends to be too much
entry. However, comparing the left hand sides of these two equations, we see
the appropriability eﬀect which tends to lead to insuﬃcient entry in the private
outcome since v￿(q)q<v(q) for a strictly concave function v(.). The intuition
is that a social planner sees the utility created by a ﬁrm, v (q),a st h ei n c e n t i v e
to enter while a ﬁrm looks at the revenue which is generated by entering, v￿ (q)q.
Since ﬁrms cannot appropriate the whole consumer surplus in this model, the
private incentive to enter falls short of the social incentive.
Hence when comparing the optimal competition outcome with the private
(Cournot) outcome along both the output and the entry dimension, we see
eﬀects pulling in opposite directions. On the one hand, the rent creation eﬀect
leads to excess entry and production in the private outcome as compared to the
optimal outcome. On the other hand, the monopoly power eﬀect leads to output
levels that are too low and the appropriability eﬀect leads to insuﬃcient entry
in the private outcome as compared to the optimum. Hence it is impossible
to derive an unambiguous comparison of the Lagrange multipliers µ and λ.
Thus we cannot say, in general, whether the private outcome is more or less
competitive than the optimal competition benchmark. To get further intuition
on this issue we consider the special case with v (q)= 1
αqα and the Pareto
eﬃciency distribution introduced in example 3.21
21The reason why this combination of utility function and eﬃciency distribution makes the
comparison particularly easy is (as we will see below) that they lead to ﬁxed mark ups of
prices over private marginal costs 1
n. In the private outcome this mark up is determined by
α and in the optimal competition benchmark by φ.
204.2 CES utility and Pareto eﬃciency distribution





φ for n>n 0 with φ<1−α
α we can






























Standard manipulation of these equations yields the following comparison with
the optimal competition benchmark derived in example 3.
Proposition 2 Let ¯ γ and ˜ γ denote resp. ¯ γ = E (1−α(1 +φ)) > 0 and
˜ γ = E
1−α(1+φ)
1−αφ > ¯ γ. Then we ﬁnd that if
γ ∈ [0,¯ γ￿ then nc = nw = n0 and qc (n) <q o (n) for all n ∈ [n0,n 1];
γ =¯ γ then nc = nw = n0 and qc (n)=qo (n) for all n ∈ [n0,n 1];
γ ∈￿ ¯ γ,˜ γ] then nc >n w = n0 and qc (n) >q o (n) for all n ∈ [nc,n 1];
γ>˜ γ then nc >n w >n 0 and qc (n) >q o (n) for all n ∈ [nc,n 1].
In words, if γ is big enough that some ﬁrms do not enter in the market
outcome (nc >n 0) then the Cournot outcome is more competitive than the
optimal competition benchmark. This can be seen by using deﬁnition 1 with
¯ n = nc. The intuition is the rent creation eﬀect: ﬁrms produce too much output
thereby generating excess rents for high eﬃciency ﬁrms. Both the high output
and the excess rents cost money and therefore there is no budget left for entering
ﬁrms. Hence the market outcome here is biased towards quantity at the expense
of variety.
Hence from a social point of view, competition authorities should not only
intervene when competition is too soft in an industry, but there may also be
a call for action when competition is too intense. Hence without recourse to
dynamic models with incomplete information as used in the literature on entry
deterence and predation, we have formalized here the idea that competition in
the market may be too intense.
Further, there is a knife edge case (γ =¯ γ) where Cournot competition is
actually optimal competition. That is, there is no mechanism (operating under
the information constraint assumed here) that can improve upon the Cournot
outcome. Cournot competition maximizes consumer welfare.
21Finally, when entry costs are rather low (γ<¯ γ) then Cournot competition
is not competitive enough. The intuition is that Cournot competition in this
case where all ﬁrms enter (nc = n0) gives away excess proﬁts in the sense that
π(n0) >γ . The optimal competition outcome, in contrast, has as a condition
π(nw)=γ, as shown in lemma 1. Therefore there is not enough budget left in
the Cournot outcome to have output levels as high as in the optimal outcome.
Note how this result contrasts with the conventional wisdom that competi-
tion authorities need not worry too much about industries with low entry costs.
This intuition is based on a Cournot model with symmetric ﬁrms. In that case,
as the entry cost goes to zero, the Cournot outcome converges to the perfect
competition outcome. Above we take seriously the idea that not all ﬁrms are
equally eﬃcient. Then with a CES utility function and Pareto distribution of
ﬁrms’ eﬃciency levels we ﬁnd that Cournot competition becomes too slack ex-
actly when the entry cost is low. This is not to say that a Pareto eﬃciency
distribution is necessarily a realistic assumption. The point is that with this
assumption and a CES utility function it is straightforward to capture the idea
that the market outcome can be too competitive. Unfortunately, we are not
aware of empirical results on the eﬃciency distribution of ﬁrms in an indus-
try (this in contrast to the public economics literature on wage and income
distributions).
5E x t e n s i o n s
This section considers three simple extensions of the model above. First, we
analyze how diﬀerent objectives for the competition authority aﬀect the optimal
competition benchmark. Second, we generalize the utility function in equation
(1) to the case where expenditure per market is not ﬁxed but depends on relative
prices. Third, we use the optimal competition benchmark to derive under which
conditions regulating a monopolist is better than opening up the industry for
competition.
5.1 Diﬀerent objectives
As surveyed by Motta (2003), historically there have been a number of objectives
speciﬁed for competition policy. Above we have focused on consumer welfare,
but other possibilities are total welfare, employment, protection of the environ-
ment, supporting national champions or defending small ﬁrms. To illustrate
how the optimal competition benchmark is aﬀected by diﬀerent objectives for
the competition authority, we consider an objective function that puts weight
on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and employment in the industry.
In this way, we show that a competition authority that wants to maximize
total welfare instead of consumer surplus tends to soften competition, as is
indeed often claimed. However, the idea that a competition authority that takes
industry employment into account should soften competition, is not correct in
the framework here.









where ζ ≥ 0 is the weight attached to producer surplus and ξ ≥ 0 is the weight
attached to employment. Note that we assume here that output in this industry
is produced with labor only and that the wage equals one. Hence employment
by a ﬁrm with eﬃciency n equals
q(n)
n . Maximizing this objective function under
the budget constraint (7) and using λ as the Lagrange multiplier for this budget
constraint, we can write the equations determining q(n),n w and λ as follows
v




















MC(n)q(n)f (n)dn +(1− F (nw))γ = E (20)
With these equations we can derive the following results. We need upperbounds
on ζ and ξ to make sure that the system determined by (19) and (20) remains
stable.
Proposition 3 Assume that the density function f (.) satisﬁes the monotone-
hazard-rate condition. Then there exist ¯ ζ,¯ ξ>0 such that a rise in ζ<¯ ζ makes
the optimal competition outcome less competitive and a rise in ξ<¯ ξ makes the
optimal competition outcome more competitive.
In other words, when a competition authority’s goal moves from consumer
welfare to total welfare (a rise in ζ) it softens competition in an industry. This
reduces output levels for high eﬃciency ﬁrms and hence allows less eﬃcient
ﬁrms to enter the industry. The entry of these less eﬃcient ﬁrms creates rents
for the more eﬃcient ﬁrms. Thus total producer surplus rises. Note that this is a
comparative static exercise within optimal competition outcomes. As illustrated
in example 1 (for c ∈￿ 2
7, 1
2￿), a more competitive market outcome can raise
industry proﬁts. However, a more competitive ’optimal competition’ outcome
always features lower industry proﬁts.
If a competition authority increases the weight on employment then it makes
competition more intense in an industry. This is contrary to common wisdom
where employment considerations are used to defend soft competition in an in-
dustry. The intuition for the result here is as follows. To maximize employment
subject to the budget constraint, the competition authority has to minimize
rents. That is, output should be produced by ﬁrms with low MC(n) and these
are high eﬃciency ﬁrms. Having low eﬃciency ﬁrms enter the industry and
produce output has as an advantage that these ﬁrms directly generate high em-
ployment for low output levels (as 1
n is high for these ﬁrms), however the rent
23creation eﬀect overturns this. Therefore employment increases with competi-
tion.
The result that employment increases with competition does depend on the
assumptions made here, in particular the one shot game nature of the model. If,
for instance, one would consider a dynamic model where ﬁrms experience cost
shocks from one period to the next and where the labor market is described by a
search and matching model as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) the following
eﬀect works in the opposite direction. If competition intensiﬁes, ﬁrms’ output
levels respond more strongly to cost shocks and therefore the inﬂow in and
outﬂow from unemployment increases. This eﬀect tends to raise unemployment.
5.2 Related markets
In equation (1) we made the convenient assumption that consumers have Cobb
Douglas preferences over industries. This implies that expenditure in each in-
dustry is ﬁxed and there are no interindustry eﬀects. In this section we consider
a more general utility set up which does allow for such cross over eﬀects. To
illustrate the main diﬀerence with the analysis above, we ask the question how
does deregulation in one market (modelled through a fall in entry cost in that
market) aﬀect the optimal competition outcome in another market?
To analyze this point in the most simple set up, we assume that there are
two industries in the economy, denoted by 1 and 2. As in section 2, let Qi
(i =1 ,2) denote the utility derived in sector i. Now instead of equation (1), we
assume that overall utility is given by
U (Q1,Q 2)
where the function U (.,.) is increasing and concave. From the analysis above
we know that, for given Ei,u t i l i t yQi equals








MCi (n)qi (n)fi(n)+[ 1−Fi (nwi)]γi −Ei
￿
where fi (.) (resp. Fi(.)) denotes the density (distribution) function of eﬃciency
in sector i with support [n0i,n 1i], nwi is the least eﬃcient ﬁrm to enter in sector
i, vi(.) is the per product utility function in sector i, λi denotes the Lagrange
mutiplier for the budget constraint in sector i, γi the entry cost in this sector







the industry marginal costs of ﬁrm n in sector
i. From proposition 1 we know that Qi is determined by the entry cost in sector
i and the expenditure in sector i. However, unlike the analysis above, Ei is an
endogenous variable now, since it is no longer exogenously ﬁxed by Ei = αiY .
In particular, Ei is determined by the following optimization problem.
max
E1,E2
U (Q1 (E1,γ1),Q 2 (E2,γ2)) subject to E1 + E2 = Y (21)
24The following result derives suﬃcient conditions under which deregulation in
sector 2 (in the sense that γ2 falls) leads to more intense optimal competition
in sector 1.




[1 − F2 (nw2)] −




then a fall in γ2 makes the optimal competition outcome in sector 1 more com-
petitive.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The ﬁrst inequality implies that
the goods in sectors 1 and 2 are complementary. As the utility Q2 derived from
sector 2 g o e su p( a si td o e sa f t e raf a l li nγ2), the marginal utility derived from
sector 1 rises as well. This tends to raise the amount of money E1 spent in
sector 1. Lemma 5 implies that higher E1 intensiﬁes competition in sector 1.
Next, using again lemma 5, the second inequality implies that the fall in γ2
reduces the marginal value of expenditure, λ2,i ns e c t o r2. This tends to reduce
E2 and hence raises E1 = Y − E2 which, as above, intensiﬁes competition in
sector 1. Hence under these conditions deregulation in sector 2 should lead to
a more competitive outcome in sector 1 as well.
5.3Regulation vs liberalization
An important policy question is whether a certain industry should be regulated
or liberalized. For a discussion of the trade oﬀs in this case, see for instance
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994). Comparing the regulated outcome with
the industry outcome after competition has been introduced, there is a clear
benchmark for the equilibrium under regulation but not for the market out-
come. For instance, Amstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) compare the optimal
regulation outcome with Cournot and Bertrand competition in the industry.
But this cannot give suﬃcient conditions for regulation to dominate liberal-
ization. To illustrate, if regulation leads to higher welfare than both Cournot
and Bertrand competition, there may still be another way of organizing the
liberalized market outcome that does better than regulation.
Here the optimal competition outcome deﬁned above yields the desired
benchmark for the liberalized outcome. If one can show that the regulated
outcome yields higher welfare than the optimal competition outcome then this
is a suﬃcient condition for regulation to be optimal. Indeed no market outcome
in this case will generate higher welfare than the regulated outcome. The fol-
lowing example illustrates this by focusing on the trade oﬀ between the bigger
capacity for the regulated monopolist and the higher eﬃciency in the market
outcome.
25Example 4 This example works with diﬀerent speciﬁcations of utility and cost
structures than the ones assumed above. The assumptions made here are closer
to the ones usually made in the optimal regulation literature. In particular, we
assume here that goods are homogenous, which seems appropriate when con-
sidering markets like electricity or water. The utility of consuming q ∈￿ +
units equals v(q)=vq with the scalar v>0. Further, the cost of spending an
amount E in this industry equals λE,w h e r eλ>0 denotes the opportunity cost
of spending money in this industry (instead of on other goods in the economy).
We assume here that λ is exogenously given. Finally, in the case of the regulated








with φ>0 common knowledge, but the eﬃciency level n cannot be observed
by the regulator. We assume that n is uniformly distributed on [0,n 1].T h e
regulator oﬀers a menu of revenue and output combinations (R(n),q(n)) and


















We assume that the regulator maximizes consumer surplus and hence leaves no















consumer welfare under regulation equals



















Using integration by parts as in the proof of lemma 2, it is routine to derive that
q(n)=
￿
0 for n<n w
v
λφ − n1























26In this example we take liberalization of the market to mean the following. The
monopolist is split up in smaller ﬁrms and other ﬁrms are allowed to enter the








where the distribution of costs after liberalization is uniform on [0,n 1 (1 +ρ)]
with δ,ρ > 0. This captures the following two eﬀects of liberalization. On
the one hand, δ>0 formalizes the idea that after liberalization the ﬁrms are
smaller and hence have smaller capacity than the regulated monopolist. On the
other hand, ρ>0 implies that, after liberalization, increased competition and
entry by new ﬁrms lead to a gain in expected eﬃciency. It is routine to verify
that the optimal competition outcome after liberalization has welfare equal to
WL =
v













n1 (1 + ρ)v
λ
￿
Hence a suﬃcient condition for regulation to be preferable over any market































In words, the economy of scale advantage of the monopolist, δ, needs to be
suﬃciently big for regulation to be optimal. One can check that the right hand
side of this inequality falls with ρ and v
λ.I fρ is small, there is hardly a gain in
eﬃciency due to liberalization and hence regulation is more likely to be optimal.
Similarly, if v
λ is big, this industry is important compared to the rest of the
economy. This implies that output will be high and hence the economies of scale
of the monopolist are important for welfare.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Instead of analyzing how a change in the number of ﬁrms in an industry or how
a change in ﬁrms’ conduct aﬀects welfare, this paper asks ’How competitive
should an industry be?’. To answer this question we have set up a mechanism
design problem. The solution of this problem is called the optimal competition
outcome. Hence we do not compare the way in which output depends on ﬁrms’
eﬃciency under diﬀerent equilibrium conﬁgurations (say, Cournot and Betrand
Nash equilibrium) but expand the domain to any incentive compatible output
function. Surprisingly, this domain expansion simpliﬁes the analysis. The solu-
tion can be characterized in a simple two dimensional diagram determining the
optimal number of ﬁrms and the optimal conduct of ﬁrms in terms of aggres-
siveness of interaction. The main reason why this works is a new way to identify
27competition in a mechanism design problem. This gain in simplicity comes at
a cost. How should one interpret the optimal competition outcome since it is
not necessarily an equilibrium outcome of a game between ﬁrms? This section
summarizes the results of our paper keeping this caveat in mind.
First, we have shown that under some conditions Cournot competition can
be optimal competition. Hence in that case an equilibrium outcome is in fact
the best possible outcome. This turns out to be a knife edge result, and the
more interesting implication here is that the market outcome can be too com-
petitive compared to the optimal outcome. In such a case, a merger that makes
competition less intense in the industry is not necessarily bad.
Second, the optimal competition outcome gives an upperbound on what
any market outcome can achieve. This is useful when the market outcome is
compared to the possibility of regulating an industry. If the regulated outcome
leads to higher welfare than the optimal competition outcome, this is a suﬃcient
condition for regulation to dominate liberalization of an industry.
Third, although the optimal competition outcome may not be implementable
it still gives a competition authority an idea of the best possible outcome it can
achieve by intervening in an industry. If the gain in welfare from moving from
the current outcome to the optimal outcome in an industry is small, there is
little use for intervention in the industry. In that case, the scarce resources of
the competition authority can be used more productively in scrutinizing other
industries.
Finally, the framework introduced here allows us to do comparative static
exercises to see how entry costs, industry expenditure and the competition au-
thority’s objective function aﬀect the optimal intensity of competition in an
industry. We showed, for instance, that for given conduct of ﬁrms there is more
need for intervention in industries where more money is spent by consumers.
Using the framework of optimal competition introduced here, we see the fol-
lowing areas for future research. First, optimal competition is derived under an
information constraint for the competition authority. We view this outcome as a
benchmark which is not necessarily implementable for a competition authority.
More restrictions can be added to the problem to derive an outcome which is im-
plementable by competition authorities. Second, above we have looked in a very
simple way at eﬀect of R&D on optimal competition. This comes back to the
debate in the endogenous growth literature and recent empirical literature on
whether intense competition or monopoly power leads to more innovation. Us-
ing the framework here one could analyze which parameters of the R&D process
call for more (or less) intense competition to stimulate innovation. Other ques-
tions that one can analyze in this framework are the following. Should industries
where the majority of ﬁrms are run by professional managers (instead of owners)
be more competitive than industries with ﬁrms run by their owners? In other
words, under which conditions should competition be intensiﬁed to alleviate the
contractual problems of a principal agent relationship. Finally, if the demand
side of a market is very concentrated does this justify less intense competition
in the industry itself? This comes back to the idea that buyer power can be
used as a justiﬁcation for a merger in the industry supplying these buyers to
28create countervailing power.
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7 Appendix: Proofs of results
Proof of Lemma 2

































n2 (1− F (n))dn, this can be written as
￿ n1
nw
{v (q(n)) − λq(n)MC(n)}f (n)dn − λ(1 −F (nw))γ +λE
when maximizing with respect to q(.) and nw the last term, λE, can be dropped
without loss of generality. Finally, λ is determined by the expenditure constraint
which can be written as
￿ n1
nw
MC(n)q(n)f (n)dn +(1− F (nw))γ = E
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
The Euler equation for q(.) c a nb ew r i t t e na s
v￿ (q(n)) = λMC (n)
Diﬀerentiating
￿ n1
nw {v (q(n)) − λq(n)MC(n)}f (n)dn − λ(1 −F (nw))γ with
respect to nw yields
v (q(nw)) = λ[q(nw)MC(nw)+γ]
Finally, as noted in the proof of lemma 2, λ is determined by the expenditure
constraint
￿ n1
nw MC(n)q(n)f (n)dn +( 1−F (nw))γ = E.Q . E . D .
Proof of Lemma 4

















From equation (5) it follows that
∂q(t)




∂λ > 0 for n close to nw.



































































30From equation (5) it follows that
∂q(n)
∂λ < 0. Further, the assumption that
v￿(q1)
v￿(q2)
is a function of
q1





MC(t) (from equation (5))
implies that
q(t)
q(n) is not aﬀected by λ. Finally, ∂nw
∂λ < 0 from equation (7).


























Proof of Lemma 5
Linearizing equations (6) and (7) with respect to nw,λ,E and γ we get
￿
q(nw)MC(nw)+γλ q (nw)MC￿(nw) ￿ n1
nw MC(n)f (n)
dq(n)








−(1 − F (nw))dγ +dE
￿














dλ < 0 and MC￿ (nw) ≤ 0.



















(1 − F (nw))dγ −dE
￿





































Proof of Corollary 1
Note that the assumtpions n0 > 0,v ￿￿(.) < 0 and limq↓0 v￿ (q)=+ ∞ together
with equations (5) and (6) imply that for γ =0we get the corner solution
nw = n0. To see this, ﬁrst note that equation (5) implies that q(n) > 0
irrespective of the value of λ ∈￿ +. Then dividing the equations (5) and (6),




which contradicts the strict concavity of the utility function v(.). Hence it must
the case that equation (6) yields a corner solution, that is
v(q(n0)) >λ[q(n0)MC(n0)]
By continuity we ﬁnd that nw = n0 for small values of γ>0 as well. That is,
there exists γ∗ > 0 such that ∂nw
∂γ =0for γ ∈ [0,γ ∗￿. The expression for dλ
dγ in
lemma 5 then implies that dλ
dγ > 0.
Now consider the case where γ becomes so big that nw approaches n1.T h e n
the expression [1 −F (nw)] in the equation for dλ
dγ in lemma 5 approaches 0 and
hence we ﬁnd dλ
dγ < 0 for γ big enough. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition2
T op r o v et h i sp r o p o s i t i o n ,w eh a v et ob eab i tm o r ec a r e f u lw i t hc o r n e r
solutions for nw and nc. Therefore we restate the conditions for the optimal
case and the Cournot case taking corner solutions explicitly into account.
First, consider the optimal competition outcome. The solution for nw is
given by equation (11) and we ﬁnd the corner solution nw = n0 if the right
hand side of this equation is smaller than 1. In that case the value of λ is given
by the budget constraint (9) (not by the ﬁrst order condition for nw,t h a ti s
(10)). So we ﬁnd the following two cases:































Case (O2): γ>˜ γ. Then we ﬁnd that nw,λ and qo (n) are determined by
equations (11)-(13).









1 − α −αφ
￿φ
Clearly, γ ≤ ¯ γ implies that nc equals the corner solution nc = n0.I nt h i sc a s e
µ is determined by the budget constraint (17) (that is, not by the free entry
condition (16)). Thus we have the following two cases:






































































Combining the four cases above, we get the following three cases (I)-(III) for γ:
(I) γ<¯ γ(< ˜ γ): then we ﬁnd that nw = nc = n0. Further, dividing the












If γ =¯ γ then it follows that nw = nc = n0 and qo (n)=qc (n).
(II) ¯ γ<γ≤ ˜ γ: then we ﬁnd that nw = n0 and nc >n 0. Then the
















We will now show that ¯ γ<γ<˜ γ implies
q
o(n)
qc(n) < 1 for all n ≥ nc.N o t et h a t
qo(n)








− (1 − α −αφ)
E
γ
+(1− α −αφ) > 0
33To ease notation, deﬁne the variable x as x ≡ (1 −α − αφ) E
γ , where the re-
strictions on γ (i.e. ¯ γ<γ<˜ γ)i m p l yt h a t1 − αφ < x < 1. Hence we need to
show that




1−α −x +( 1−α − αφ)
This follows from the following observations:




w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ea s s u m e di n e q u a l i t yφ<1−α
α several times. For instance,
proving that g(1−αφ) > 0 boils down to showing that
(1 + φ)(1−αφ)
αφ
1−α > 1 (22)
This inequality can be seen as a function φ where φ lies in the interval ￿0, 1−α
α ￿.
Hence we need to show that

























Coming back to the function g(.) above. We see that the function g (.)
crosses the x-axis at x =1and g(.) is decreasing at that point. Further, g(.) is
concave and strictly positive at x =1− αφ.T h i si m p l i e st h a tg (x) is strictly
positive for all x ∈￿ 1 −αφ,1￿.
(III) γ>˜ γ: then we ﬁnd that nw,n c >n 0. In particular, using the expres-













1 − α −αφ
￿φ
= nc












where the inequality follows from equation (22) proved above. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Linearizing equations (19) and (20) with respect to nw,λ,ζand ξ and writing
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∂VC(nw)
∂λ



























f (n)dn > 0









∂ξ follow from equation (18). Denoting
the determinant of the matrix above by ∆, we ﬁnd that
∆=( MC(nw)q(nw)+γ)
2 f (nw)−
& & & &
∂VC(nw)
∂λ









where the inequality follows for values of ξ,ζ > 0 that are close enough to 0.I n






+ζη(nw)q(nw) < 0 (23)
for ξ<¯ ξ and ζ<¯ ζ.









































35Using the inequalities derived above and the inequality assumed in (23), it is




The sign of dnw
dζ turns out to be ambiguous, however we do not need the expres-
sion for dnw
dζ as shown below.























dζ > 0, we ﬁnd that
dq(n1)
dζ < 0. The monotone hazard rate condition
implies that
1−F(n)
nf(n) falls with n. Hence there are two possibilities. First, it is
possible that
dq(n)
dζ > 0 for low n. Second, it is possible that
dq(n)
dζ < 0 for all n.
Then the budget constraint (20) implies that dnw
dζ < 0. In both cases deﬁnition
1i m p l i e st h a tar i s ei nζ makes the outcome less competitive.
Now we turn to the eﬀect of ξ. Solving the equations above in matrix
notation for dλ
dξ and dnw






































































The inequality in equation (23) implies that ω ∈￿ 0,1￿.U s i n g t h i s , w e w i l l
now argue that dλ
dξ ∈￿ 0,1￿ by showing that dλ
dξ in equation (24) can be seen
36as the weighted average of two terms which are each between 0 and 1.U s i n g









∂λ |. Equation (18) implies that
∂q(n)








≤ 1 for all n ∈ [n0,n 1]
Hence we ﬁnd that
∂VC(nw)





























)i nb e t w e e n0 and 1.T h e r e f o r edλ
dξ ∈￿ 0,1￿.
























Hence it follows from dλ




Now we have two possibilities (again using the fact that
1−F(n)
nf(n) is decreasing
in n by the monotone hazard rate property). First, it can be the case that
dq(n)
dξ < 0 for low values of n. Second, it can be the case that
dq(n)
dξ > 0 for
all n, but then the budget restriction (20) implies that dnw
dξ > 0.I nb o t hc a s e s
deﬁnition 1 implies that competition rises with ξ. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 4
Since we are interested in how outcomes vary with entry costs and expen-
diture in a sector, we write the optimal value of the following optimization
problem as a function of γi and Ei








MCi (n)qi (n)fi (n)+[ 1−Fi (nwi)]γi −Ei
￿
37Using the budget constraint of the sectoral allocation problem, E1 + E2 = Y ,
we can write the overall optimization problem as
max
E2
U (Q1 (Y −E2,γ1),Q 2 (E2,γ2))













∂Qi . The spillover eﬀect of a fall in γ2 to sector 1 works via
the amount of money spent in sector 1, E1 = Y − E2. Hence we use the ﬁrst








































∂Qi∂Qj . Note that the bracketed expression on the left hand side




































12λ1λ2 (1 −F (nw2)) −U￿￿
22λ
2





By the assumption that U￿￿
12 ≥ 0 and the concavity of U (which implies
U￿￿
22 < 0) we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst two terms on the right hand side are positive.
Finally, the other inequality assumed in the proposition implies (see lemma 5)
that ∂λ2
∂γ2 ≥ 0. Hence we ﬁnd that dE2
dγ2 > 0. This implies that a fall in γ2 leads
to a fall in E2 and therefore a rise in E1 = Y − E2. Again using lemma 5, we
ﬁ n dt h a tar i s ei nE1 makes the optimal competition outcome more competitive



















Figure b: corner solution for nw
BC l
n0
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Figure c: industries I and II cannot be ranked
Figure 2: using definition 1 to compare the intensity of competition in



























































































Figure 3: Optimal competition as a function of the entry cost
Entry Cost